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Abstract 
 
Theories predict that, due to investor under-diversification, idiosyncratic risk is 
positively priced in expected stock returns. Empirical studies based on various 
methodologies yield mixed evidence. This study circumvents the debate on 
methodological issues and traces the pricing of idiosyncratic risk to its economic source 
– investor under-diversification. Assuming that institutional investors tend to hold more 
diversified portfolios and thus care little about idiosyncratic risk relative to individual 
investors, we find that the positive relation between idiosyncratic risk and stock returns 
is significantly stronger (weaker) in stocks that are held and traded more by individual 
(institutional) investors. In addition, the pricing of idiosyncratic risk becomes weaker 
over time as institutional investors become more dominant in the US equity market. 
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1. Introduction 
Modern portfolio theory suggests that investors hold a portfolio of stocks to diversify 
idiosyncratic risk (Markowitz, 1952; 1959). Building on this principle, the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) predicts that all investors hold the market portfolio in equilibrium. 
As a result, only systematic risk is priced in equilibrium and idiosyncratic risk is not. The 
assumptions of the CAPM are however too simple to be true and hence, in reality, 
investors do not behave as predicted. For various reasons many investors do not hold 
well diversified portfolios.  
Blume and Friend (1975) provide early evidence on investors’ lack of diversification 
for their portfolios. Using income tax return data, they find that most U.S. investors hold 
only one or two stocks. Based on the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data, Kelly 
(1995), and Polkovnichenko (2005) confirm the poor diversification of U.S. household 
portfolios. Families that have investments in stocks tend to hold individual stocks directly 
and the median number of stocks in their portfolios is only one or two most of the time. 
Moreover, families tend to hold a disproportionally large number of stocks of the 
companies which family members are working for. In a sample of more than 62,000 
household investors from a U.S. brokerage house, Goetzmann and Kumar (2002) show 
that more than 25% of the investor portfolios contain only one stock, over half of the 
investor portfolios contain no more than three stocks, and less than 10% the investor 
portfolios contain more than ten stocks. Similarly, Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007) 
find evidence of under-diversification in Swedish household portfolios. The proposed 
reasons for investors’ lack of diversification include the presence of fixed transaction costs 
(Brennan, 1975; Bloomfield, Leftwich, and Long, 1977), limited investor attention on a 
subset of stocks (Merton, 1987), investors’ preference for skewness (Kraus and 
 2 
Litzenberger, 1976; Lim, 1989; Harvey and Siddique, 2000; Barberis and Huang, 2008), 
employees’ loyalty toward their working company (Cohen, 2009), rank-dependent 
preferences (Polkovnichenko, 2005), investors’ preference for downside protection and 
upside potential in constructing portfolios (Shefrin and Statman, 2000), investors’ desire 
for portfolio insurance in the presence of margin and short-sale constraints (Liu, 2009), 
overconfidence (Odean, 1999), and information advantage (Van Nieuwerburgh and 
Veldkamp, 2009).  
Theories assuming under-diversification predict a positive relation between 
idiosyncratic risk and expected returns. See, for example, earlier studies such as Levy 
(1978), Merton (1987) and more recently, Malkiel and Xu (2001), Barberis and Huang 
(2008), Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2009) among others. Empirical evidence on the 
relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns is however mixed. Douglas 
(1969) regresses mean annual returns on variances of annual returns in a single regression 
for a large sample of U.S. stocks for the period 1946-1963 and find a positive relation. 
Miller and Scholes (1972) point out that Douglas’ empirical methods are subject to several 
sources of bias and misspecification and criticize his results as “deeply disturbing”.  In a 
subsequent study, Fama and MacBeth (1973) sort individual stock betas to form 20 
portfolios in each period and regress equal-weighted portfolio returns on average beta 
and average idiosyncratic volatility of the stocks in the portfolios. To control for the cross-
sectional correlations among residuals, they employ the later popular Fama-MacBeth 
method to construct test-statistics. They find that the time-series average coefficient 
estimate for idiosyncratic volatility is indistinguishable from zero and thus argue that 
idiosyncratic risk is not priced in cross-sectional returns.  
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This conclusion has been accepted for a long time until recently Malkiel and Xu (2001) 
employ very similar empirical methods to Fama and MacBeth (1973) on more recent data 
and find some positive pricing of idiosyncratic risk. More strikingly, Ang, Hodrick, Xing, 
and Zhang (2006) find that, in the cross-section of stocks, high idiosyncratic volatility in 
this month predicts abnormally low average returns in the next month. They describe this 
negative relation as “a substantive puzzle” because it is “inconsistent with any extant 
asset pricing theory”. In a subsequent study, Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2009) 
further confirm this negative relation in stock markets in the US and other developed 
countries.1  
Fu (2009) argue that the relation between stock returns and the lagged idiosyncratic 
volatility cannot be used to infer the relation between expected stock returns and 
idiosyncratic risk, because idiosyncratic volatility is time-varying and the lagged value is 
a poor estimate of the expected value. Improving the estimation by EGARCH models, he 
finds a significantly positive relation between expected idiosyncratic volatility and 
                                                 
1 Ang et al.’s findings have generated much research interest. Bali and Cakici (2008) suggest that 
Ang et. al’s results are sensitive to: (i) data frequency used to estimate idiosyncratic volatility, (ii) 
weighting schemes used to compute average portfolio returns, (iii) breakpoints utilized to sort 
stocks into quintile portfolios, and (iv) using a screen for size, price, and liquidity, and therefore 
are not robust. Fu (2009) and Huang, Liu, Rhee, and Zhang (2009) point out that Ang et al.’s results 
are driven by monthly stock return reversals. The negative relation between average return and the 
lagged idiosyncratic volatility disappears after controlling for the difference in the past-month 
returns. Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2009) suggest that idiosyncratic volatility is a good predictor 
of expected skewness–-an explanatory variable of cross-sectional returns (Kraus and Litzenberger, 
1976; Lim, 1989; Harvey and Siddique, 2000). The negative relation greatly reduces after controlling 
for expected skewness. Using the maximum daily return over the past month as a proxy for 
lottery-like stocks, Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2009) confirm that investors’ preference for those 
stocks helps to explain the negative relation between average returns and lagged idiosyncratic 
volatilities. Han and Kumar (2009) also find that the negative relation is more pronounced among 
stocks that retail investors like to speculate. Jiang, Xu, and Yao (2009) show that both high 
idiosyncratic volatility and low future returns are related to a lack of information disclosure among 
firms with poor earnings prospects. Investors underreact to earnings information in idiosyncratic 
volatility. George and Hwang (2009) suggest that the negative relation is more evident in stocks 
that are not covered by financial analysts. Similarly, Duan, Hu, and McLean (2009) suggest this 
negative relation is significant only in stocks with short sell constraint. 
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expected stock returns. Following his EGARCH method, Brockman, Schutte, and Yu (2009) 
find the positive relation in the stock markets of most other countries. Spiegel and Wang 
(2006) and Eiling (2006) also confirm the positive relation in U.S. stocks based on the 
EGARCH estimates of conditional idiosyncratic volatility. Inspired by the famous Roll’s 
critique, Choi (2009) criticizes existing studies’ use of the Fama-French three-factor model 
as the default asset pricing model in estimating idiosyncratic volatility and shows that the 
positive relation between conditional idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns disappears 
if some additional market returns are included to estimate idiosyncratic volatility. These 
markets include US corporate and Treasury bonds, real estate investment trusts, 
commodity futures, and foreign stocks and bonds.  
Most of the debates so far are on the methodological issues such as estimation of 
conditional idiosyncratic risk, weighting of portfolio returns, inclusion of return factors 
and control variables. We take a different approach by tracing the pricing of idiosyncratic 
risk to its economic source – investor diversification. Investors in reality are 
heterogeneous in the level of diversification for their portfolios. In general institutional 
investors tend to hold more diversified portfolios than individual investors do. If the 
positive relation between idiosyncratic risk and expected returns is driven by investor 
under-diversification, we expect to observe a stronger (weaker) relation in stocks that are 
held and traded by under-diversified (diversified) investors. In this study, we examine if 
returns of stocks that are held and traded more by institutional investors are less affected 
by their idiosyncratic risk compared to stocks that are held and traded more by individual 
investors. Following Fu (2009), we examine the contemporaneous relation between 
idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns to infer if idiosyncratic risk is indeed priced. 
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Our sample includes stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq during the 
period of 1980-2007. In each month, we divide stocks into three equal-size groups based 
on their aggregate institutional ownership in the previous quarter-end and then sort 
stocks in each group into quintiles based on their expected idiosyncratic volatility. This 
procedure results in 15 portfolios in each month. For each tercile of institutional 
ownership (i.e., high, middle, low), we compute the monthly return spread between the 
highest idiosyncratic volatility portfolio and the lowest idiosyncratic volatility portfolio. 
They are, respectively, 5.37%, 2.65%, and 0.89% in equal-weighted portfolios  (3.85%, 
1.74%, and -0.56% in value-weighted portfolios) for the low, middle, and high tercile of 
institutional holdings. Stocks with high expected idiosyncratic volatility earn significantly 
higher returns than stocks with low expected idiosyncratic volatilities. But this relation is 
more significant in stocks held more by individual investors. For the stocks that are 
favored by institutional investors, we do not find robust evidence that higher 
idiosyncratic volatilities are associated with higher stock returns. We further examine the 
impact of institutional ownership on the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and 
individual stock return in the Fama-MacBeth regressions, which allow us to control for 
other known determinants of cross-sectional returns including size, book-to-market 
equity ratio, momentum, liquidity and its variability. The regression results confirm that 
low (high) institutional ownership strengthens (weakens) the positive relation between 
idiosyncratic risk and stock return. The differences are both statistically and economically 
significant. Moreover, our empirical results are robust to different measures of 
idiosyncratic risk and different measures of investor diversification.  
Institutional ownership of public stocks has been increasing steadily in the U.S. equity 
markets. For example, Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) show that the median 
 6 
institutional ownership for NYSE and AMEX stocks increases from about 10% in 1980 to 
55% in 2002. Using Thomson Financial 13f data, we confirm the increasing pattern of 
institutional ownership both for NYSE/AMEX stocks and Nasdaq stocks in an extended 
period. If the market is dominated by diversified investors who care little about 
idiosyncratic risk, we expect to see less pricing of idiosyncratic risk. This motivates our 
time-series analysis. In particular, we examine whether the time-series increase in 
aggregate institutional ownership is associated with a diminishing relation between 
idiosyncratic risk and expected return. We indeed find that the average return premium 
for idiosyncratic volatility decreases over time. This negative trend is more pronounced 
for stocks traded in the NYSE or AMEX and during the sub-period of 1980-1997.  
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and key 
variables. Section 3 presents the empirical results of cross-sectional tests and Section 4 
presents the empirical results of time-series tests. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Variables 
Our sample includes stocks traded in the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq during the 
period January 1980 to December 2007. Daily and monthly stock returns are obtained 
from the CRSP. We start the sample in 1980 to match the institutional ownership dataset – 
Thomson Financial’s 13(f) reports. Institution investors in the U.S. are mandated to file 
13(f) reports to the SEC within 45 days of the end of each calendar quarter. The reports 
detail all equity positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value. 2 
                                                 
2 The reporting institutions constitute the majority of institutional holdings. According to Sias, 
Starks, and Titman (2006), the total market value of the equity holdings of institutions filing 13(f) 
reports (and thus included in the database) accounts for about 90% of the Conference Board 
estimate of total institutional investor equity holdings.  
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Thomson Financial’s 13(f) dataset summarizes key variables of institutional ownership 
and has 976,591 firm-quarter observations for 22,428 stocks for the period 1980-20073.   
The key variable in our study is the influence of investor diversification on individual 
stocks. Motivated by empirical observations, we assume institutional investors such as 
mutual funds tend to hold better diversified portfolios than average individual investors. 
Hence, we measure the influence of institutional investors on each stock by the proportion 
of aggregate outstanding shares held by them. We note this measure as Institutional 
Ownership (IO). The same measure has been used by previous studies such as Parrino, 
Sias, and Starks (2003), Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006) and Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter 
(2005). Microstructure literature suggests that security prices are determined by the 
trading of marginal investors. Although holding a stock can be considered a passive form 
of trading, we construct an alternative measure to capture the intensity of occurred 
trading by institutional investors. Implicitly we assume that the likelihood of institutional 
investors determining the stock price is higher if the intensity of institutional trading is 
higher for this stock. We measure the trading intensity by the ratio of institutional trading 
to the total trading volume on this stock. In particular, we follow Shu (2009) to compute 
the Fraction of Institutional Trading (FIT), where the numerator is the sum of absolute 
changes in institutional ownership from quarter to quarter and the denominator is the 
total trading volume of this stock within the quarter (from CRSP monthly return file)4. We 
                                                 
3 Among the 976,591 firm-quarter observations, 812,103 have matching CUSIPs in the CRSP data. 
4 This measure however suffers from two potential problems: (1) it does not capture round-trip 
trades by the same institutional within a quarter; and (2) it double-counts trades between 
institutional investors. The first problem leads to underestimation while the second problem leads 
to overestimation of institutional trading. Due to these concerns we stick to institutional holding as 
our primary measure and use the institutional trading measure to check robustness of results.  
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find a very positive correlation between these two variables of institutional investor 
influence. 
The other key variable, idiosyncratic risk, is also measured in two different ways. 
In each month we regress daily excess returns of each individual stock on the Fama-
French three factors, and compute the standard deviation of the regression residuals5. We 
require stocks to have at least 15 trading days (and return observations) during the month. 
This idiosyncratic volatility estimate can be viewed as ex-post realized idiosyncratic risk. 
Our second proxy for idiosyncratic risk follows Fu (2009), which is a one-month ahead 
idiosyncratic volatility predicted by EGARCH models. In each month, we regress all 
available past excess returns on the Fama-French monthly factors while imposing nine 
different EGARCH specifications on the time-series process of residuals6. The explicit 
functional forms of the EGARCH models are as follows: 
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The monthly return process is described by the Fama-French three-factor model as in Eq. 
(1). The conditional (on the information set at time t-1) distribution of residual itε is 
assumed to be normal with the mean of zero and the variance of 2itσ . The conditional 
variance, 2itσ , is assumed a function of the past p-period of residual variance and q-period 
of return shocks as specified by Eq. (2). Each model is employed independently for each 
individual stock. We choose the estimates from the specification that converges and yields 
                                                 
5 Daily market, size, and book-to-market factors are obtained from Kenneth French’s website 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/  
6 The nine EGARCH (p, q) specifications are (p=1,q=1), (p=1, q=2), (p=1, q=3), (p=2, q=1), (p=2, 
q=2), (p=2, q=3), (p=3, q=1), (p=3, q=2), and (p=3, q=3).  
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the lowest Akaike Information Criterion. We also require stocks to have at least 30 
consecutive monthly returns to be eligible for the estimation.  
We also construct firm characteristic variables that are known cross-sectional 
determinants of stock returns. They are market capitalization, book-to-market equity 
ratio, compounded return from the past six months, average turnover in the past 36 
months and the coefficient of variation of past turnovers, employed respectively to control 
for the effects of size, value (vs. growth), momentum, and liquidity on stock returns. 
Summary statistics for these variables are reported in Panel A of Table 4. Panel B reports 
the correlations between these variables.  
The pooled sample between 1980 and 2007 has 800,645 firm-month observations. The 
average monthly return (Return (%)) is 1.40%. The average realized (IVOL) and expected 
idiosyncratic volatilities (E(IVOL)) are 13.00% and 12.53%, respectively. The average 
institutional ownership (IO) is 32.73%, which means that about one-third of the 
outstanding shares for a typical stock are owned by financial institutions. The average 
fraction of institutional trading (FIT) is 50.30%. Later we show there is a large increase in 
institutional ownership and trading over time.  
 
3. Empirical Findings from Cross-Sectional Tests 
Markowitz (1952, 1959) demonstrates how investors can diversify away idiosyncratic 
risk of individual stocks without sacrificing expected return and concludes that investors 
should “put their eggs in different baskets”. However, his suggestion is not always 
followed in reality, especially by individual investors. In this paper, we do not examine 
the underlying reasons for investor under-diversification, which has been done by many 
studies. Instead, we start from the fact that some investors under-diversify and 
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empirically examine how under-diversification affects the equilibrium relation between 
idiosyncratic risk and expected returns. 
Theories assuming under-diversification predict a positive relation between 
idiosyncratic risk and expected returns. The intuition is straightforward. If investors hold 
few stocks only, they would certainly take idiosyncratic risk into consideration when 
making portfolio allocation decisions. On the other hand, if investors hold well diversified 
portfolios as Markowitz suggests, they would care little about the idiosyncratic risk of a 
particular stock in their portfolio as it contributes little to the risk of the whole portfolio. 
An interesting question is who are the marginal investors that determine the price (and 
thus return) of a stock. We propose that the preference of investors who have big 
influence via both holding and trading dominates the pricing of this stock. Since 
institutional investors tend to hold more diversified portfolios than individual investors 
do, we propose that the pricing of idiosyncratic risk is less significant in stocks that are 
largely held and traded by institutional investors and is more significant in stocks that are 
largely held and traded by individual investors.  
We study the cross-sectional relation between institutional ownership and the pricing 
of idiosyncratic risk in two ways, one by return analysis on portfolios sorted on 
institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility and the other by Fama-MacBeth 
regressions of individual stock returns on idiosyncratic volatility and other control 
variables. 
 
3.1. Portfolio return analysis 
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In each month, we sort all stocks into terciles based on the percentage of institutional 
ownership (IO) as of the end of the last quarter.7  We then divide stocks in each tercile into 
quintiles based on monthly idiosyncratic risk. We use two measures for idiosyncratic 
risk: realized idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) and expected idiosyncratic volatility 
(E(IVOL)). Detailed estimation of these measures is provided in the previous section. This 
procedure results in 15 portfolios in each month. On average each portfolio has about 250 
stocks. Table 1 reports the time-series medians of the cross-sectional median stock 
characteristics for each portfolio.   
The percentage of institutional ownership ranges between 4.29% (the portfolio of 
stocks with the highest IVOL in the lowest IO tercile) and 60.18% (the portfolio of stocks 
with the second lowest IVOL in the highest IO tercile). But within each IO tercile, we do 
not find institutional ownership differs much across idiosyncratic risk quintiles. If any, the 
highest IVOL portfolios in each IO tercile tend to have slightly lower institutional 
ownership than the other four IVOL portfolios in their respective IO tercile. However, we 
find significant differences in IVOL between stocks that are favored by institutional 
investors and those not favored. In general, stocks held more by institutional investors 
tend to have lower idiosyncratic volatility.  
The patterns on fraction of institutional trading (FIT) and expected idiosyncratic 
volatility (E(IVOL)) are similar to those on IO and IVOL, respectively. It suggests high 
correlations between the two measures of institutional investor influence and the two 
measures of idiosyncratic risk. Not surprisingly, institutional investors trade significantly 
                                                 
7 The composition of terciles remains almost same during the three months following 13(f) filings 
except for delisting of some firms. 
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more in stocks that they have a higher percentage of ownership and relatively more in 
stocks with lower idiosyncratic volatility.  
Table 1 also shows two significant patterns of firm size across portfolios. Size is 
measured by market capitalization. In general, size is positively related to institutional 
ownership and negatively related to idiosyncratic volatility. Institutional investors prefer 
large stocks and large stocks tend to have lower idiosyncratic volatility. In addition, 
stocks favored by institutions have lower median book-to-market equity ratio, suggesting 
their preference for growth stocks.  
Table 2 presents both equal- and value-weighted returns for portfolios formed on IO 
and IVOL. We also compute the difference in returns between the highest and lowest 
IVOL quintiles in each IO tercile. It works as if we long the portfolio of stocks with the 
highest IVOL and short the portfolio of stocks with the lowest IVOL and rebalance the 
portfolios monthly. A positive return spread indicates higher returns for higher IVOL 
stocks or equivalently, a positive relation between idiosyncratic volatility and average 
return. We also run time-series regressions of the hedging portfolio returns on the Fama-
French three factors to estimate the alpha, which measures the excess return that is not 
explained by the market, size, and book-to-market factors. 
Consistent with Fu (2009), we find a positive difference in returns between the highest 
and lowest IVOL portfolios. More importantly, institutional ownership has a significant 
influence on the return spread. In particular, the equal-weighted return spread between 
the highest and lowest IVOL quintiles drops from 5.37% for the low institutional 
ownership tercile to 0.89% for the high institutional ownership tercile. If value-weighted, 
the spread decreases from a statistically significant 3.85% to an insignificant -0.55%. We 
find consistent results based on the alphas estimated from the Fama-French three factor 
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model. In sum, idiosyncratic volatility is positively related to returns of the stocks that are 
held more by individual investors while the relation is not obvious in stocks that are held 
more by financial institutions. The evidence lends support to the theories that argue the 
pricing of idiosyncratic risk being driven by investor under-diversification. 
In Table 3, we replace IVOL by E(IVOL) to form portfolios and then compute portfolio 
returns. The results are qualitatively similar. We find positive pricing of idiosyncratic risk 
in stocks held more by individual investors but no significant relation between expected 
idiosyncratic risk and stock return in stocks that are favored by institutional investors.  
 
3.2. Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions 
Although intuitive and economically meaningful, the portfolio sorting methodology is 
often limited by the appropriate dimensions of sorting. In particular, our previous results 
do not account for the widely documented effects on stock returns from other variables 
such as size, value (vs. growth), momentum, and liquidity. In order to better isolate the 
effect of investor diversification on the pricing of idiosyncratic risk, we employ the 
popular Fama-MacBeth regressions as in Fu (2009). In particular, we regress monthly 
stock returns on idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL or E(IVOL)), control variables including 
market capitalization, book-to-market equity ratio, past six-month return, mean and the 
coefficient of variation of past turnovers, and for the purpose of our tests, two interaction 
variables between idiosyncratic volatility and institutional ownership (or trading). The 
time-series average coefficients are reported and the time-series standard errors are used 
to evaluate the statistical significance.  
We create four indicators to denote high or low institutional ownership or trading 
fraction. lowitIO (
low
itFIT ) is an indicator that equal one if the institutional ownership 
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(trading) of stock i at t is in the lowest tercile of the distribution and zero otherwise. 
Simiarly, highitIO  (
high
itFIT ) is an indicator that equals one if the institutional ownership 
(trading) of stock i at t is in the highest tercile or zero otherwise. The variables of our 
interest are the interaction terms of idiosyncratic risk variables with these indicators. 
Tables 5 and 6 present the regression results. In Table 5 we investigate the effect of 
institutional ownership (IO) on the relation between idiosyncratic risk and expected 
return. We then replace IO by FIT and the results are reported in Table 6. Confirming the 
findings of Fu (2009), we find significantly positive coefficient estimates for IVOL and 
E(IVOL) in all model specifications. Moreover, we find significantly positive coefficient 
estimates for the interaction variables of IVOLt* lowitIO , E(IVOLt)*
low
itIO ,  IVOLt*
low
itFIT , and 
E(IVOLt)* lowitFIT , significantly negative coefficient estimates for IVOLt *
high
itIO and 
E(IVOLt)* highitIO , and negative but not significant coefficient estimates for 
IVOLt* highitFIT and E(IVOLt)*
high
itFIT . The findings suggest that the positive pricing of 
idiosyncratic risk is significantly stronger in stocks that are held and traded more by 
individual investors, is significantly weaker in stocks that are held more by financial 
institutions, and is arguably weaker in stocks that are traded more by financial 
institutions. In general, the evidence further confirms the findings from portfolio analysis.   
 
4. Empirical Findings from Time-Series Tests 
Institutional ownership of public stocks has been increasing in the U.S. equity markets 
in the past decades (Friedman, 1996; Bennett, Sias, and Starks, 2003; Asquith, Pathak, and 
Ritter, 2005; Blume and Keim, 2008).  Similar to previous studies, we find that the median 
institutional ownership for NYSE and AMEX stocks increased steadily from about 20% in 
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1980 to 67% by the end of 2006. The median institutional ownership of Nasdaq stocks also 
increases from almost nil to 37% during this time period. Given that the market 
dominance of diversified investors who care little about idiosyncratic risk has risen so 
dramatically, we expect to see less pricing of idiosyncratic risk as time goes by. In 
particular, we expect that the time-series increase in aggregate institutional ownership has 
weakened the positive relation between idiosyncratic risk and expected return. 
 To conduct this test while controlling for the changes in idiosyncratic risk and 
institutional ownership brought by new firms entering the market (Fink, Fink, Grullon 
and Weston, 2009; Irvine and Pontiff , 2009; Fama and French, 2004), we construct a new 
sample in which stocks that appear in the 13F dataset are included for their lifetime. If a 
stock is dropped from the 13F reports in a particular quarter, it is retained in the sample 
and we assume that institutional ownership during that quarter is zero.  By doing this, we 
effectively exclude all U.S. stocks that have not been held by institutions during the 
sample period.  Since the purpose of this test is to determine whether changes in 
institutional ownership produce subsequent changes in the idiosyncratic risk premium, it 
makes sense to focus our attention on the subsample of stocks in which institutional 
ownership changes actually occur.     
We estimate the idiosyncratic risk premium in each month t by fitting cross-sectional 
regressions of the form:  
ittittittittittitttit IVOLbCVTurnLnbTurnLnbtbMEBELnbMELnbbR 6543210 )()()7,2(Re)/()( +++−−+++=
 
(3) 
The monthly idiosyncratic risk premium is captured by the coefficient b6t.  IRPq  is the 
median of the coefficients of these three months in quarter q.  We match quarterly 
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observations with aggregate institutional ownership measures for the U.S. market. 
Average (Median) IOq-1 is the average(median) fraction of institutional ownership for all 
stocks in the quarter preceding quarter q.  Since according to theory, changes in investor 
diversification produce subsequent changes in the idiosyncratic risk premium, we lag our 
institutional ownership measures by one quarter. The series run for 111 quarters, from the 
first quarter in 1980 to the third quarter in 2007. 
Panel A in Table 7 presents simple statistics for the quarterly series. The mean IRPq is 
0.25. This means that in general, investors are willing to bear an additional 0.25% for each 
additional percentage point of idiosyncratic volatility. The mean of means institutional 
ownership is 24.69%, while the mean of medians is 29.50%. 
Figure 1.a. illustrates the evolution of median institutional ownership and the 
idiosyncratic risk premium for US stocks. Similar to what has been documented in 
Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) we observe a clear upward trend in median 
institutional ownership over the sample period. The quarterly idiosyncratic risk premium 
is much more volatile and to appreciate the series’ low frequency movements we plot not 
only the series but also its forward-looking four-quarter moving average. We observe that 
this series declines from 1980 to the late 1990s. From that point onwards, the series 
becomes more erratic and a trend is harder to appreciate. We conjecture that the erratic 
behavior in the idiosyncratic risk premium is the result of profound changes in stock 
return volatility for US firms, especially those firms traded in the Nasdaq.  Schwert (2002) 
shows that the volatility in Nasdaq markets behaves abnormally since 1998; he 
hypothesizes that   volatility in the Nasdaq, which is made up by smaller firms with more 
growth options than the S&P 500 firms, has become unusually erratic mostly due to the 
introduction of new information technologies in the last decade. To better observe the 
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relation between diversification and the idiosyncratic risk premium we break the sample 
into Nasdaq and NYSE/AMEX firms, if the unusual volatility in Nasdaq is causing the 
erratic behavior of the idiosyncratic risk premium, we expect the negative relation 
between institutional ownership and the idiosyncratic risk premium to be more evident in 
the NYSE/Amex firms. Further, we break down the sample period into two, 1980-1997 
and 1998-2007. If new technologies and more growth options have affected the 
idiosyncratic risk premium after 1998, the negative relation between diversification and 
the idiosyncratic risk premium should be more evident in the earlier part of the series. 
Figure 1.b illustrates the relation between median institutional ownership and the 
idiosyncratic risk premium for NYSE/AMEX firms. In this figure the positive trend in 
institutional ownership and the negative trend in the idiosyncratic risk premium are very 
clear. The erratic behavior the idiosyncratic risk premium post 1998 also appears in this 
series, but softened. Figure 1.c illustrates the relation between median institutional 
ownership and the idiosyncratic risk premium for Nasdaq firms. A linear trend in the 
idiosyncratic risk premium for these firms is hard to identify. 
Panel B presents linear trend coefficients for the series. We obtain these coefficients by 
regressing the variables of interest against a time dummy. We find a negative trend in the 
idiosyncratic risk premium for the full sample. As expected, this trend becomes much 
stronger between 1980 and 1997. The trend coefficient for 1980-1997 is -0.62 x10-4 (t-statistic 
of -4.30) while for the entire sample period is -0.10x10-4 (t-statistic of -1.08). For firms 
traded in the NYSE/AMEX, the idiosyncratic risk premium has a negative and significant 
trend during the full period which becomes even stronger between 1980 and 1997. The 
linear trend coefficient for NYSE/AMEX firms in the 1980-1997 subperiod is -0.62x104 (t-
statistic of -3.54) while for the full period is about half, -0.32x104 (t-statistic of -3.14).  
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Panel C presents Pearson correlations coefficients of IRPq with Average IOq-1 and IRPq 
with Median IOq-1. The two series show a negative correlation, although not statistically 
significant. This correlation becomes much stronger for NYSE/AMEX stocks during the 
1980-1997 sub-period. The correlation between IRPq and Average IOq-1 for the subsample is 
-0.40, and between IRPq and Median IOq-1 is -0.39, both coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
In conclusion, the times-series analysis confirms our main result from the cross-
sectional analysis. It shows that investor diversification has had a negative effect on the 
idiosyncratic risk premium in the US, particularly during the 1980s and most of the 1990s.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Modern portfolio theory suggests that investors hold diversified portfolios to shirk 
idiosyncratic risk. The CAPM further predicts that in equilibrium all investors hold the 
market portfolio and only systematic risk is priced and idiosyncratic risk is not. 
Diversification, though taught as a rule of thumb for investment, is not always adopted by 
investors in real life. For a multitude of reasons many individual or household investors 
do not hold well diversified portfolios. Theories that acknowledge the violation of the 
diversification assumption predict a positive relation between idiosyncratic risk and 
expected returns. The empirical existence of this relation has been debated almost since 
the time that Markowitz first proposes the portfolio theory. Perplexingly, articles finding 
a positive relation are about as many as articles finding no relation or even a negative 
relation.  
Most of the debates so far are on the methodological issues such as estimation of 
conditional idiosyncratic risk, weighting of portfolio returns, inclusion of return factors 
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and control variables. In this study we take a different approach and trace the pricing of 
idiosyncratic risk to its economic source – investor diversification. We know that investors 
differ widely in their diversification levels and that in general financial institutions hold 
better diversified portfolios than individual investors. Hence, if investor under-
diversification leads to a positive relation between idiosyncratic risk and expected returns, 
the relation should be stronger (weaker) in stocks that are dominated by individual 
(institutional) investors. We find evidence to support this hypothesis.  
We conduct our tests in a sample of stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq 
during the period of 1980-2007, and included in the SEC 13(f) reports. These stocks are 
held and traded by financial institutions in different degrees. We perform cross-sectional 
and time-series tests and they both confirm that the positive pricing of idiosyncratic risk is 
more pronounced when the influence of institutions on stock prices is less significant. We 
test the cross-sectional relations between institutional ownership, idiosyncratic volatility, 
and expected returns using a portfolio sorting method and through Fama-MacBeth 
regressions. We find that stocks with high expected idiosyncratic volatility earn 
significantly higher average returns. More importantly, this relation is stronger for stocks 
dominated by individual investors. For the stocks dominated by institutional investors, 
we do not find robust evidence that higher idiosyncratic volatilities are associated with 
higher returns. Institutional investors are known to have an increasing importance in the 
US equity market. Our time-series tests suggest that the average return premium for 
idiosyncratic volatility decreases over time. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis 
that investor diversification plays an important role for the pricing of idiosyncratic risk. 
Our study contributes to the literature by first documenting an empirical link between 
investor diversification and the pricing of idiosyncratic risk. 
 20 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of portfolios sorted by institutional ownership and idiosyncratic risk  
 
This table shows the times series medians of the cross-sectional median stock characteristics for 15 portfolios sorted on institutional ownership 
and idiosyncratic volatility. The sample includes stocks traded in the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq during 1980-2007. In each month, we first sort 
stocks into thirds based on institutional ownership as of the end of the last quarter and then divide each third into quintiles based on monthly 
idiosyncratic volatility. Institutional ownership (IO) is the proportion of outstanding shares held by financial institutions. Idiosyncratic volatility 
(IVOL) is the standard deviation of regression residuals from the Fama-French three-factor model, adjusted to the monthly magnitude. The 
fraction of institutional trading (FIT) is the proportion of total trading involving institutions. The estimation of FIT follows Shu (2009). E(IVOL) is 
the one-month ahead expected idiosyncratic volatility estimated by EGARCH models. The estimation of E(IVOL) follows Fu (2009). Size is 
measured as the market capitalization in millions of US dollars as of the last June.  BE/ME is the ratio of book-value of equity at last fiscal year-
end divided by the market capitalization of last June. The median number of stocks in each portfolio is 244. We obtain institutional ownership 
data from Thomson Financial’s 13(f) reports, return data from CRSP, and financial data from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database. 
 IO (%)  IVOL (%) 
Idiosyncratic volatility quintile  Idiosyncratic volatility quintile Institutional 
ownership low 2 3 4 high  low 2 3 4 high 
Low 6.23 6.69 6.36 5.75 4.29  5.01 8.79 12.96 18.92 31.71 
Middle 28.36 28.21 27.50 26.61 24.72  4.13 6.64 9.44 13.21 21.04 
High 58.60 60.18 59.50 57.69 54.27  4.02 5.66 7.32 9.54 14.09 
 FIT (%)  E(IVOL) (%) 
Idiosyncratic volatility quintile  Idiosyncratic volatility quintile Institutional 
ownership low 2 3 4 high  low 2 3 4 high 
Low 16.87 12.39 9.17 7.61 5.55  6.89 9.52 12.71 15.30 19.16 
Middle 48.69 45.86 36.60 29.35 23.63  5.85 7.88 9.89 12.02 14.97 
High 72.92 72.80 66.98 54.49 43.88  6.14 7.11 8.22 9.78 12.15 
 Size  (in USD millions)  BE/ME 
Idiosyncratic volatility quintile  Idiosyncratic volatility quintile Institutional 
ownership low 2 3 4 high  low 2 3 4 high 
Low 8.20 5.36 3.64 2.55 1.31  0.94 0.83 0.70 0.68 0.71 
Middle 37.55 19.54 12.29 8.66 4.47  0.82 0.74 0.70 0.67 0.69 
High 156.37 112.69 70.20 42.47 24.03  0.61 0.58 0.59 0.53 0.52 
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Table 2 
Average returns of portfolios sorted by institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility 
 
This table shows the times series mean portfolio returns for 15 portfolios sorted on institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility. The sample 
includes stocks traded in the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq during 1980-2007. In each month, we first sort stocks into thirds based on institutional 
ownership as of the end of the last quarter and then divide each third into quintiles based on monthly idiosyncratic volatility. The definition of 
variables is presented in Table 1. Return spread is the difference in portfolio returns between the highest and lowest idiosyncratic volatility 
quintiles. FF-3 factor alpha is the intercept estimated from the time-series regression of monthly return spreads on the Fama-French three factors. 
Panel A shows the results based on equal-weighted returns and Panel B shows the results based on value-weighted returns. 
Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio return 
Idiosyncratic volatility quintile Institutional 
Ownership low 2 3 4 high 
Return 
Spread 
t-value 
(spread) 
FF-3 factor 
alpha 
t-value 
(alpha) 
Low 0.30 0.13 0.12 0.86 5.67 5.37 7.22 4.04 7.33 
Middle 0.61 0.74 0.90 1.46 3.26 2.65 4.77 1.41 4.28 
High 0.85 1.18 1.39 1.68 1.74 0.89 2.10 -0.07 -0.24 
 
Panel B: Value-weighted portfolio returns 
Idiosyncratic volatility quintile Institutional 
Ownership low 2 3 4 high 
Return 
Spread 
t-value 
(spread) 
FF-3 factor 
alpha 
t-value 
(alpha) 
Low 0.85 0.92 1.13 1.33 4.71 3.85  4.31 2.68 4.41 
Middle 0.87 1.30 1.31 1.30 2.61 1.74  2.40 0.52 1.08 
High 1.08 1.40 1.45 1.45 0.52 -0.56 -1.05 -1.33 -1.83 
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Table 3 
Average returns of portfolios sorted by institutional ownership and expected idiosyncratic volatility 
 
This table shows the times series mean portfolio returns for 15 portfolios sorted on institutional ownership and expected idiosyncratic volatility. 
The sample includes stocks traded in the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq during 1980-2007. In each month, we first sort stocks into thirds based on 
institutional ownership as of the end of the last quarter and then divide each third into quintiles based on monthly expected idiosyncratic 
volatility. The definition of variables is presented in Table 1. Return spread is the difference in portfolio returns between the highest and lowest 
expected idiosyncratic volatility quintiles. FF-3 factor alpha is the intercept estimated from the time-series regression of monthly return spreads on 
the Fama-French three factors. Panel A shows the results based on equal-weighted returns and Panel B shows the results based on value-weighted 
returns. 
 
Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio returns 
E(IVOL) quintile Institutional 
Ownership low 2 3 4 high 
Return 
Spread 
t-value 
(spread) 
FF-3 factor 
alpha 
t-value 
(alpha) 
Low 0.70 0.50 0.33 0.86 4.69 3.99 5.87 2.99 5.54 
Middle 1.06 1.00 1.07 1.08 2.76 1.70 3.54 0.72 2.37 
High 1.21 1.31 1.32 1.34 1.67 0.46 1.36 -0.34 -1.70 
 
Panel B: Value-weighted portfolio returns 
E(IVOL) quintile Institutional 
Ownership low 2 3 4 high 
Return 
Spread 
t-value 
(spread) 
FF-3 factor 
alpha 
t-value 
(alpha) 
Low 1.02 0.81 0.80 1.00 2.78 1.77 2.45 0.88 2.10 
Middle 1.02 1.11 1.33 0.63 2.04 1.03 1.99 0.10 0.28 
High 1.19 1.22 1.31 1.25 1.25 0.06 0.16 -0.54 -1.25 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics for the pooled sample: April 1980 to December 2007 
 
Panel A of this table reports the pooled descriptive statistics of stocks owned and traded by financial institutions as reported to the SEC in form 
13F from the first quarter of 1980 to the fourth quarter of 2007. Panel B presents the time series means of the cross-sectional Pearson correlations 
among these variables. Return(%) is the monthly raw dividend and split-adjusted return in percentage terms. Ln(ME) and Ln(BE/ME) are the 
natural logarithms of market value of equity and book-to-market ratio estimated as in Fama and French (1992.) Market value of equity is the 
product of monthly closing price and the number of shares outstanding as of the last June. Book-to-market ratio is the fiscal year-end book value 
of equity divided by the calendar year-end market value of equity. (IVOL) is (realized) idiosyncratic volatility. To estimate IVOL in every month, 
we regress the excess daily returns of each stock on the Fama-French three factors. The monthly idiosyncratic volatility of the stock is the standard 
deviation of the regression residuals times the square root of the number of observations in the month. E(IVOL) is the one-month-ahead expected 
idiosyncratic volatility estimated by EGARCH models following the model specifications in Fu(2009.) Return(-2,-7) is the compounded gross 
return for months t-7 to t-2. TURN is the average stock turnover and CVTURN is the coefficient of variation of turnovers in the past 36 months. To 
control for the potential effect of extreme values and coding errors on coefficient estimates we replace the smallest and largest 0.5% of the ME, 
BE/ME, IVOL, E(IVOL), Return(-2, -7), TURN, and CVTURN with their next smallest or largest values. We delete observations with monthly 
returns greater than 300%. We test the hypothesis Prob > |t| under H0: ρ=0 on the average correlation coefficients. t-statistics for these tests are 
reported in parentheses underneath each coefficient. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the pooled sample 
Variable N Mean σ Q1 Median Q3 Skewness 
Return (%) 862,625 1.40 16.19 -5.91 0.29 7.12 2.43 
IVOL (%) 862,625 13.00 11.11 6.09 9.63 15.84 2.83 
E(IVOL) (%) 862,625 12.53 9.46 6.83 9.99 15.04 3.34 
IO (%) 862,625 32.73 26.74 8.84 26.77 52.87 0.59 
FIT (%) 800,645 50.30 73.54 14.33 36.89 64.61 10.72 
Ln(ME) 862,625 5.05 2.06 3.53 4.88 6.43 0.32 
Ln(BE/ME) 862,625 -0.43 1.05 -0.97 -0.40 0.10 0.75 
Return(-2, -7) 861,463 1.08 0.40 0.88 1.05 1.23 2.92 
Ln(TURN) 862,625 1.68 1.03 1.01 1.69 2.36 -0.23 
Ln(CVTURN) 862,624 4.14 0.47 3.83 4.13 4.43 0.15 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional simple correlations 
 IVOL E(IVOL) IO FIT Ln(ME) Ln(BE/ME) Return(-2, -7) Ln(TURN) Ln(CVTURN) 
0.09 0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.003 Return 
 (6.91) (6.23) (0.64) (2.32) (-0.51) (5.23) (4.07) (-2.71) (-0.69) 
0.52 -0.31 -0.23 -0.45 -0.05 -0.15 0.11 0.29 IVOL  
 (166.08) (-86.60) (-64.51) (-92.65) (-8.55) (-13.26) (16.01) (49.67) 
-0.25 -0.21 -0.38 -0.13 -0.07 0.18 0.27 E(IVOL)  
 
 
 (-56.38) (-64.55) (-83.41) (-27.39) (-6.30) (27.88) (64.21) 
IO    0.37 0.65 -0.17 0.04 0.31 -0.46 
    (48.58) (400.09) (-23.51) (7.46) (44.87) (-88.11) 
FIT     0.29 -0.02 -0.01 -0.25 -0.14 
     (42.93) (-6.80) (-1.86) (-51.50) (-37.52) 
Ln(ME)      -0.22 0.04 0.17 -0.59 
      (-30.85) (5.26) (28.04) (-83.98) 
Ln(BE/ME)       0.06 -0.15 0.14 
       (9.29) (-27.32) (31.99) 
Return(-2, -7)        -0.01 0.04 
        (-1.04) (5.59) 
Ln(TURN)         -0.12 
         (-21.80) 
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Table 5 
Influence of institutional ownership on the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and expected returns 
 
This table presents the time-series averages of cross-sectional regression coefficients using the standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology. 
The t-statistic is the average slope divided by its time-series standard error. The sample consists of all stocks owned and traded by financial 
institutions as reported to the SEC in form 13F from the first quarter of 1980 to the fourth quarter of 2007, descriptive statistics for the pooled 
sample are shown in Table 4. The dependent variable, Return(%),is the monthly raw dividend and split-adjusted return in percentage terms. 
Ln(ME) and Ln(BE/ME) are the natural logarithms of market value of equity and book-to-market ratio.  (IVOLt) is (realized) idiosyncratic 
volatility.  E(IVOLt) is the one-month-ahead expected idiosyncratic volatility estimated by EGARCH models as in Fu(2009.) Return(-2,-7) is the 
compounded gross return for months t-7 to t-2. TURN is the average stock turnover and CVTURN is the coefficient of variation of turnovers in the 
past 36 months. IVOLt * lowitIO captures the effect of low institutional ownership on the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and expected 
returns; where lowitIO  is an indicator that takes the value of one if the institutional ownership of stock i at the quarter-end before month t is in the 
lowest tercile and zero otherwise. IVOLt * highitIO captures the effect of high institutional ownership on the relation between idiosyncratic volatility 
and expected returns; where highitIO  is an indicator that takes the value of one if the institutional ownership of stock i at the quarter-end before 
month t is in the highest tercile and zero otherwise. We delete observations with monthly returns greater than 300%. To control for the potential 
effect of extreme values and coding errors on coefficient estimates we replace the smallest and largest 0.5% of the ME, BE/ME, IVOL, E(IVOL), 
Return(-2, -7), TURN, and CVTURN with their next smallest or largest values. This substitution has no effect on inference. The last column reports 
the average R-squares of the cross-sectional regressions. 
 
Panel A: Fama MacBeth regressions where idiosyncratic risk proxy is IVOL 
Model N Ln(ME) Ln(BE/ME) Ret(-2,-7) Ln(Turn) Ln(CVTurn) IVOLt IVOLt *
low
itIO  IVOLt *
high
itIO  2R  
1 233      0.13 0.10  0.05 
       (5.06) (8.59)   
2 233      0.19  -0.12 0.05 
       (8.38)  (-6.66)  
3 233 0.31 0.56    0.16 0.09  0.06 
  (7.60) (8.58)    (6.53) (7.12)   
4 233 0.37 0.54    0.23  -0.11 0.06 
  (9.04) (8.37)    (9.72)  (-5.77)  
5 233 0.28 0.48 1.82 -0.56 -0.50 0.20 0.08  0.08 
  (7.24) (8.57) (7.73) (-6.13) (-5.58) (8.56) (6.60)   
6 233 0.33 0.47 1.83 -0.52 -0.52 0.26  -0.10 0.08 
  (8.48) (8.38) (7.88) (-5.51) (-5.99) (11.43)  (-5.55)  
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Panel B: Fama MacBeth regressions where idiosyncratic risk proxy is E(IVOL) 
Model N Ln(ME) Ln(BE/ME) Ret(-2,-7) Ln(Turn) Ln(CVTurn) E(IVOLt) E(IVOLt) *
low
itIO  E(IVOLt) *
high
itIO  2R  
1 233      0.08 0.09  0.03 
       (4.27) (7.73)   
2 233      0.14  -0.09 0.03 
       (7.22)  (-5.84)  
3 233 0.17 0.55    0.11 0.08  0.04 
  (3.73) (8.26)    (6.09) (7.10)   
4 233 0.20 0.54    0.164  -0.08 0.04 
  (4.65) (8.15)    (9.06)  (-5.05)  
5 233 0.12 0.49 1.22 -0.53 -0.55 0.14 0.07  0.06 
  (2.70) (8.48) (5.13) (-5.62) (-5.98) (9.62) (6.54)   
6 233 0.15 0.48 1.23 -0.52 -0.55 0.19  -0.07 0.06 
  (3.49) (8.37) (5.20) (-5.34) (-6.24) (11.72)  (-4.63)  
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Table 6 
Influence of institutional trading on the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and expected returns 
 
This table presents the time-series averages of cross-sectional regression coefficients using the standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology. 
The t-statistic is the average slope divided by its time-series standard error. The sample consists of all stocks owned and traded by financial 
institutions as reported to the SEC in form 13F from the first quarter of 1980 to the fourth quarter of 2007, descriptive statistics for the pooled 
sample are shown in Table 4. The dependent variable, Return(%),is the monthly raw dividend and split-adjusted return in percentage terms. 
Ln(ME) and Ln(BE/ME) are the natural logarithms of market value of equity and book-to-market ratio.  (IVOLt) is (realized) idiosyncratic 
volatility.  E(IVOLt) is the one-month-ahead expected idiosyncratic volatility estimated by EGARCH models as in Fu(2009.) Return(-2,-7) is the 
compounded gross return for months t-7 to t-2. TURN is the average stock turnover and CVTURN is the coefficient of variation of turnovers in the 
past 36 months. IVOLt * lowitFIT captures the effect of low institutional trading on the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and expected returns; 
where lowitFIT  is an indicator that takes the value of one if the institutional trading of stock i at the quarter-end before month t is in the lowest 
tercile and zero otherwise. IVOLt * highitFIT  captures the effect of high institutional trading on the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and 
expected returns; where  highitFIT is an indicator that takes the value of one if the institutional trading of stock i at the quarter-end before month t is 
in the highest tercile and zero otherwise. We delete observations with monthly returns greater than 300%. To control for the potential effect of 
extreme values and coding errors on coefficient estimates we replace the smallest and largest 0.5% of the ME, BE/ME, IVOL, E(IVOL), Return(-2, -
7), TURN, and CVTURN with their next smallest or largest values. This substitution has no effect on inference. The last column reports the 
average R-squares of the cross-sectional regressions. 
 
Panel A: Fama MacBeth regressions where idiosyncratic risk proxy is IVOL 
Model N Ln(ME) Ln(BE/ME) Ret(-2,-7) Ln(Turn) Ln(CVTurn) IVOLt IVOLt *
low
itFIT  IVOLt *
high
itFIT  2R  
1 226      0.15 0.06  0.05 
       (6.35) (5.03)   
2 226      0.18  -0.02 0.05 
       (7.36)  (-1.02)  
3 226 0.28 0.53    0.18 0.05  0.06 
  (6.36) (7.90)    (7.61) (3.99)   
4 226 0.34 0.52    0.21  -0.01 0.06 
  (7.87) (7.92)    (8.67)  (-0.51)  
5 226 0.26 0.46 1.84 -0.42 -0.56 0.22 0.04  0.08 
  (6.57) (7.90) (7.43) (-4.55) (-6.28) (9.63) (3.36)   
6 226 0.32 0.44 1.81 -0.45 -0.60 0.24  -0.01 0.08 
  (8.27) (7.80) (7.35) (-4.83) (-6.54) (10.32)  (-0.56)  
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Panel B: Fama MacBeth regressions where idiosyncratic risk proxy is E(IVOL) 
Model N Ln(ME) Ln(BE/ME) Ret(-2,-7) Ln(Turn) Ln(CVTurn) E(IVOLt) E(IVOLt) *
low
itFIT  E(IVOLt) *
high
itFIT  2R  
1 226      0.10 0.05  0.03 
       (5.53) (4.37)   
2 226      0.13  -0.02 0.03 
       (6.33)  (-1.27)  
3 226 0.13 0.53    0.12 0.05  0.04 
  (2.79) (7.74)    (7.18) (4.08)   
4 226 0.18 0.51    0.15  -0.02 0.04 
  (3.98) (7.83)    (8.02)  (-1.07)  
5 226 0.10 0.47 1.26 -0.44 -0.60 0.15 0.04  0.06 
  (2.21) (7.86) (5.03) (-4.59) (-6.60) (10.98) (3.16)   
6 226 0.15 0.46 1.24 -0.46 -0.62 0.18  -0.01 0.06 
  (3.51) (7.87) (4.96) (-4.88) (-6.73) (10.39)  (-0.80)  
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Table 7 
Time- series results on institutional ownership and the idiosyncratic risk premium 
 
This table presents time series tests performed on institutional ownership and the idiosyncratic risk 
premium. We estimate the idiosyncratic risk premium on each month t 
by fitting cross-sectional regressions of the form: 
ittittittittittitttit IVOLbCVTurnLnbTurnLnbtbMEBELnbMELnbbR 6543210 )()()7,2(Re)/()( +++−−+++=
IRPq  is the median of the coefficient estimates b6t in quarter q. Average (Median) IOq-1 is the 
average(median) fraction of institutional ownership for all stocks that have been included in the 
13F reports between the first quarter of 1980 and the third quarter of 2007 in quarter q-1. If a stock 
does not appear in the 13F reports in a particular month, it is assumed that institutional ownership 
is zero.  N is number of quarters in the series. Panel A presents simple statistics for the quarterly 
series. Panel B presents linear trend coefficients for the series. We obtain these coefficients by 
regressing the variables of interest against a time dummy. The reported coefficients are magnified 
10,000 times (i.e. x104).  The values in parentheses are t-test statistics for the existence of a linear 
trend in the series. Panel C presents Pearson correlations coefficients of IRPq with Average IOq-1 
and IRPq with Median IOq-1. The values in parentheses are p-values for the correlation coefficient 
being statistically different from zero. 
 
Panel A: Simple summary statistics of the times series 
Variable N Mean std P25 Median P75 skewness 
 IRPq 111 0.25 0.29 0.05 0.20 0.44 0.84 
Average IOq-1 111 24.69 9.48 18.75 24.09 28.95 0.61 
Median IOq-1 111 29.50 7.98 23.68 29.33 34.00 0.40 
 
Panel B: Linear trend coefficients 
 All firms NYSE/AMEX firms NASDAQ firms 
 1980-2007 1980-1998 1980-2007 1980-1998 1980-2007 1980-1998 
IRPq -0.10 -0.62 -0.32 -0.62 0.047 -0.43 
 (-1.08) (-4.30) (-3.14) (-3.54) (0.46) (-2.65) 
Average IOq-1  26.60 23.60 31.70 37.10 31.60 26.70 
 (52.65) (42.84) (59.77) (56.44) (51.67) (55.97) 
Median IOq-1 31.00 26.10 45.50 46.40 32.00 27.50 
 (36.88) (39.09) (78.83) (52.61) (35.97) (65.61) 
 
Panel C: Pearson correlation coefficients 
 All firms NYSE/AMEX firms NASDAQ firms 
 Correlation of Median IRPq with 
 1980-2007 1980-1998 1980-2007 1980-1998 1980-2007 1980-1998 
Average IOq-1  -0.06 -0.41 -0.30 -0.40 0.08 -0.29 
 (0.54) (<0.001) (0.001) (<0.001) (0.43) (0.013) 
Median IOq-1 -0.05 -0.43 -0.28 -0.39 0.08 -0.28 
 (0.58) (<0.001) (0.002) (<0.001) (0.42) (0.017) 
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Figure 1 
Institutional ownership and the idiosyncratic risk premium during 1980-2007 
 
Figure 1.A: All firms 
 
 
 
Figure 1.B: NYSE/AMEX firms only 
 
 
 
 
 36 
Figure 1.C: Nasdaq firms only 
 
 
 
 
 
